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OIL CONSERVATION, PRODUCING CAPACITY,
AND NATIONAL SECURITY*
WALLACE F. LOVEJOYt

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is twofold: (1) to examine the question of whether state oil conservation regulations can be relied on
to provide the necessary amounts of idle well-head producing
capacity to meet national security needs; and (2) to present a
methodology for estimating the costs of maintaining given amounts
of idle producing capacity. The first part of the paper develops some
of the general background to support the position that state conservation regulations are not dependable to generate needed amounts
of idle capacity. The second part takes recent data on drilling and
equipping costs and relates them to unused capacity by regions to
determine a rough measure of investment in idle capacity. Space
does not permit a detailed analysis of the benefits and shortcomings of state oil conservation regulations or of the problems of
defining national security needs. Enough general comments are
made on each of these to provide a framework for the more central questions.
I
BACKGROUND

Oil conservation regulations in recent years have been subjected
to considerable criticism from both within and outside of the industry.1 The most frequently heard criticisms are: that the laws and
regulations have failed to keep pace with changing drilling and
* I am indebted to the following people for commenting on an earlier draft of
this paper: Morris A. Adelman, Richard L. Gordon, Leslie Cookenboo, Nathan
Edmonson, Sam S. Schurr, Morris Muscat, W. A. Trost, Granville Dutton, and
Joseph Lerner. Errors of fact and interpretation are, of course, mine.
t Professor of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas.
1. W. F. Lovejoy & P. T. Homan, Economic Aspects of Oil Conservation Regulation (1967) ; McDonald, Conservation Regulation and Incentives for Sound Growth
of the Domestic Petroleum Industry, in Essays in Petroleum Economics (S. H. Hanke &
S. L. Gardner eds. 1967); M. G. DeChazeau & A. E. Kahn, Integration and Competition in the Petroleum Industry (1959) ; Davidson, Public Policy Problems of the
Domestic Crude Oil Industry, 53 Am. Econ. Rev. 97 (1963) ; J. W. McKie & S. L.
McDonald, Petroleum Conservation in Theory and Practice, 76 Q.J. Econ. 92 (1962) ;
A. E. Kahn, The Depletion Allowoance in the Context of Cartelization, 54 Am. Econ.
Rev. 286 (1964) ; M. A. Adelman, Efficiency of Resource Use in Crude Petroleum, 31
S. Econ. J. 101 (1964) ; M. T. Halbouty, Conservation-Total or Partialf, paper be-
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production technology; that market demand proration systems as
conceived tend to stimulate over-drilling; that these systems often
discriminate in favor of high cost oil and against low cost oil; that
these systems have generated significant amounts of unused producing capacity at the well-head, and these investments must be
recovered in higher prices from the capacity being utilized; that
these systems, while they do not fix crude oil prices, tend to keep
prices from falling and generally stabilize them; and that political
and equity goals in conservation often seem to take priority over
efficiency goals.
This article does not intend to review these arguments and the
literature devoted to them. Many of these criticisms are less valid
today than ten or even five years ago. For example, small tract
drilling is now an historical curiosity in most states, and no longer
occurs. Statutes requiring the compulsory pooling of properties to
form drilling units have been enacted in all major producing states. 2
There are, of course, thousands of producing wells on small tracts,
but these diminish in number as the years pass. The 1960 Louisiana
Depth-Acreage Schedule, and to a greater extent the 1965 Texas
Yardstick, have gone part of the way in encouraging optimum well
spacing. Statutory unitization has been adopted in several states,
but Texas still stands against it.3 Economic pressures have forced
more and more voluntary unitization everywhere.
During the past two years there has been a greater utilization of
producing capacity. This has occurred while the ratio of reserves to
production has continued to slide, much to the consternation of
industry and government officials. As more capacity is utilized, inefficiencies generated by the prorationing system are reduced. Wells
already at capacity get none of the additional market as restrictions
are loosened; thus, increments to growth go to wells with excess
capacity.
In recent years, idle producing capacity has been seized upon as
an important element available to meet U.S. national security
fore the Southwestern District, Production Division, American Petroleum Institute,
Dallas, Tex., March 2-4, 1960; U.S. Dep't of Interior, Press Release setting forth
letter from the Secretary of the Interior to Governor Matthew E. Welsh, Chairman
of the Interstate Oil Compact Comm'n, April 4, 1963; United States Petroleum Study
Committee, A Report to the President 4-5 (mimeograph ed. 1962) ; American Petroleum Institute, Statement of Policy: Conservation, Development and Production Practices 3 (1963).
2. Texas was the last to enact such a statute, and this was done in 1965. Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 6008c (1965).
3. A statutory unitization bill in the 1968 Texas legislature almost succeeded and
was supported by a significant group of Texas "independents."
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needs. 4 And indeed, national security has become perhaps the most
crucial question for the oil industry and for the nation in the energy
field. Upon the national security arguments rests the justification for
the oil import control system, for special treatment of income from
oil and gas production under federal income taxation, and to a
lesser but still important degree, for oil conservation regulation.
The 1969 debate over national security centers on the oil import
control system, but, in fact, this system in conjunction with market
demand prorationing makes up the supply control system for the
U.S. Without import controls conservation controls become difficult, if not impossible, to implement.5
The interaction of import controls and conservation controls on
national security is noted in a 1968 study by the Interior Depart6
ment.
The national security requirements of the Nation's oil supply involve two distinct features: one, a continuing supply adequate for
foreseeable needs; and two, an emergency supplementary supply to
accommodate either a sudden increase in demand, an interruption to
normal supply or both.
The nation has sought to satisfy the first requirement through an
import control program which, although permitting a large trade
with Free World oil exporting nations, reserves the bulk of the
U.S. petroleum market to domestic producers and refiners. The
second requirement has to date been satisfied largely by the happenstance of idle capacity, although periodically the nation has felt
some concern for it, dating back to the set-aside of the Elk Hills
Naval Petroleum Reserve in 1912. .

.

. The money costs to the

nation of these measures to assure continued petroleum supply are
substantial, and are extensively co-mingled with those of State
conservation measures which depend upon import controls for their
effectiveness, and which contributed to the idle productive capacity
on which the nation depends for its emergency production reserve.

This general view of national oil policy is no longer accepted by
all. For the first time since mandatory import controls were im-

posed in 1959, the tandem system of supply regulation-state proration controls and federal import controls-is being attacked by
4. See address by Stanley Learned, Director and former Vice Chairman of the
Board, Phillips Petroleum Co., Petroleum Conservation: The Myths and Realities, to
the 8th Annual Institute on Exploration and Economics, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Tex., Mar. 7, 1968, at 17.
5. See the testimony of Comm'r Jim C. Langdon, Tex. R.R. Comm'n, before the
Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary Comm., May 21, 1969.

6. U.S. Dep't of Interior, United States Petroleum Through 1980, at 89 (1968).
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powerful political interests
along with several economists from the
7
academic community.
The Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import Control appointed by
President Nixon has asked: "What is the distinctive security interest of this Nation in maintaining secure petroleum supplies for
the United States?"' How the Task Force answers this question will
ultimately determine much of the policy that will follow, in terms
of both imports and state oil conservation. Little work had been
done in this area before the submissions to the Task Force by the
industry and other interested groups.' Hopefully, this work will
result in a thorough analysis of the question. We shall not tackle
the national security question here, but rather shall assume that
there will be a need for the U.S. to be at least partially self-sufficient in petroleum. If we need to have some form of "reserve"
available, what form should the "reserve" take? And more specifically, can we rely on the present systems of controls and incentives to provide what is needed?
II
SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CAUSES OF IDLE CAPACITY

The experience of the oil industry in developing producing capacity in the 1950's and 1960's should cast some light on the
prospects for developing and maintaining a national security reserve of capacity in the future. Arguments have been made from
time to time that the unused capacity was generated primarily by
our market demand proration systems. Others have argued that
new completion technology such as formation fracturing techniques
and new secondary recovery technology were the major contributors to the growth in idle capacity since the end of World War II.
Still others argue that the oil industry overestimated its long-run
growth rate of demand in the post-war years and was caught with
its long lead-time investments in exploration and development that
continued to generate capacity beyond the realization of the need
7. See The Year Oil Gets Its Lumps, Business Week, May 17, 1969, for a review
of the forces and arguments at work in the 1969 controversy. Hearings before the
Senate Antitrust Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee in the Spring of 1969
focused many of these issues and gave them national prominence. The New England
congressional delegation has been particularly aggressive in attacking the oil import
control program.
8. 34 Fed. Reg. 8056 (1969).
9. See W. F. Lovejoy, Oil Import Policies as They Relate to National Security,
paper before the Rocky Mountain Petroleum Economics Institute, Colorado Springs,
Colo., June 25, 1969 (to be published by the Colorado School of Mines), for a discussion of alternative national security postures.
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for lesser growth rates. 10 Each element has no doubt played a part
in the over-investment, and to separate the effects would be difficult
if not impossible. Some analysis of these causes should, however,
reveal their interdependence and their significance.
State ConservationRegulations
A prime candidate for the major cause of unused producing capacity is state conservation regulation and, more specifically, market-demand proration systems which have created incentives for
overdrilling. This argument has been developed in detail elsewhere
and will only be summarized here." Briefly, it can be argued that
the state market-demand proration systems taken collectively in
the United States have had the effect of maintaining a relatively
stable price for crude oil, and at the same time assuring every owner
of a producing oil well that he would have a market for at least
some of the oil that his well was capable of producing. Production
in each of these states was limited by regulation to what crude oil
purchasers were willing to buy. A market for oil from individual
wells was assured by allocating allowed production among all the
wells in a given state. As long as an oil producer felt he could obtain
sufficient revenue from production to earn a satisfactory profit,
he would continue to invest in additional producing capacity. In
order to get more revenue a producer had to have more allowable;
and with total supply restricted, he could get more allowable only
by drilling more wells or by changing in some way the regulatory
status of existing wells to obtain more favorable allowable treatment.
Aggravating this situation were proration formulas which gave
part of an allowable on the basis of the number of wells in a field
and part on the basis of acreage drained. This practice is no longer
followed, but many of the wells drilled under such formulas are
still with us. The depth-acreage schedules, or Yardsticks themselves,
tended to induce over-drilling in many instances. For example, a
6,500-foot well under the 1947 Texas Yardstick had a top allowable of 81 barrels daily if drilled on ten-acre spacing, 91 barrels
daily on twenty-acre spacing, and 111 barrels daily on forty-acre
spacing. If an operator had 160 acres to develop, he could get a
top allowable of 1,296 barrels daily if he could convince the Texas
Railroad Commission to approve ten-acre spacing, and only 444
barrels daily if he drilled on forty-acre spacing. Depending on well
A.

10. This interesting hypothesis was suggested in personal correspondence by
Nathan Edmonson, Corporate Planning Department, Humble Oil and Refining Company, June 20, 1969. Time has not permitted testing this hypothesis.
11. See Lovejoy & Homan, supra note 1 at 268-271; Kahn, supra note 1.
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costs, well capabilities, the degree of market demand restriction,
and other variables, a company might opt for closer spacing. At
any rate, the example illustrates the rationale. The Oil Industry
Advisory Committee, appointed by Governor Connally of Texas,
in its presentation of the new 1965 Yardstick before the Railroad
Commission, argued that the new schedule would establish " . . .
producing rates for fields discovered in the future to remove the
incentive to drill unnecessary wells."' 2 The Committee went on to
point out that "under inadequate allocation yardsticks, any improvements in oil prices or market demand factors will increase
close spacing incentives and stimulate the development of excess
producing capacity." The 1965 Yardstick was adopted and incentives to overdrill were reduced. The incentives to overdrill were
by no means unique to Texas. Oklahoma and Kansas had even
greater incentives in this direction. The Louisiana schedule was
better from this standpoint than the 1947 Texas Yardstick.
B.

Changes in Technology

The details of the impact of developing technology in drilling,
completion, and production are spelled out in the National Petroleum Council study, Impact of New Technology on the U.S. Petroleum Industry, 1946-65.13 There has been no single major, revolutionary change that stands out in this area, but there have been
important innovations across the board which have reduced costs
and increased recovery of oil. Certainly, formation fracturing has
been one of the more important changes. This usually involves putting fluids into a well under sufficient pressure to crack the producing
formation. Where the reservoir has large quantities of oil in place
but low permeability, such a completion technique can greatly
augment both producing capacity and ultimate recovery in a field. It
was estimated that between 1950 and 1965, 176,037 old wells and
243,424 new wells were hydraulically fractured with 7.3 billion
barrels of additional reserves attributable to this completion technique alone.' 4 While no data are available specifically on producing
capacity of treated wells, it was estimated that on a sample of
9,360 wells treated, production increased an average of 175 percent.'" Fracturing of new wells will no doubt continue, but the additions to producing capacity in the 1950's realized from fracturing
12. Hearings on the Tex. Allowable Yardstick before the R.R. Comm'n of Tex.,
July 16, 1964.
13. Nat'l Petroleum Council, Impact of New Technology on the U.S. Petroleum
Industry, 1946-65 (1967).
14. Id. at 116.
15. Id. at 114.
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old wells will never be repeated. It should be emphasized that
hydraulic fracturing made entire fields and reservoirs commercial
which otherwise would not have been.
Another major area in which capacity and reserves have been
directly augmented by technology is in secondary recovery operations. For example, the NPC estimates that ten billion barrels of
the reserves added during the twenty-year period from 1946
through 1965 were a result of fluid injection projects. 6 This was
more than one-sixth of the gross additions to reserves during this
period. In 1962 fluid injection projects accounted for almost thirty
percent of total U.S. production,' and the figure has grown since
then.
The extension of drilling and production technology to offshore
oil provinces has perhaps been the single greatest "innovation" in
the industry to maintain its reserves and capacity position. In 1967,
twelve percent of U.S. oil production came from offshore areas. 8
This will grow in the future. As recently as 1963, offshore production accounted for 29 percent of total Louisiana production. By
1968 this figure had risen to 40 percent.' 9 Growth offshore will depend partly on state and federal leasing policies and partly on the
ability of the industry to drill in deeper water. While no data are
available to support the hypothesis, it is probably true that we have
added more to reserves than we have to producing capacity in the
offshore areas. Put another way, drilling and completion costs are
higher offshore, and well-spacing has tended to be wider. Thus, we
have fewer wells and less producing capacity per barrel of reserves
offshore.
Without prolonging the discussion, it is obvious that technology
helps explain the growth in producing capacity since World War
II. It can also be argued convincingly, however, that conservation
regulations have had some effect in directing technology. For example, in Texas during the 1950's and early 1960's a number of
secondary-recovery operations were given exempt status under prorationing. Considerable controversy arose over whether such projects should be subjected to market demand restrictions. It was
argued that some projects were put in specifically to avoid restrictions. This culminated in a statewide hearing in 1960 to examine
the question, but no statewide rule was adopted. The Commission,
16.
17.
18.
(1969).
19.

Id. at 202.
Id. at 201.
National Petroleum Council, Petroleum Resources Under the Ocean Floor 7
La. Dep't of Conservation, Annual Oil and Gas Report 12 (1968).
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however, did tighten its policies in granting exemptions from restrictions. If such projects were given preferential treatment in
allowables, should we attribute the increased producing capacity
that resulted to technology or to the regulations? No clear answer
can be given.
Regulations have had some effect on offshore drilling. Bonus
allowables are granted to offshore wells in both Texas and Louisiana
for any given depth-acreage pattern. These higher offshore allowables are justified because of higher costs. It can also be argued,
however, that these allowables give incentives for companies to
drill offshore. Examples such as these illustrate the interrelationships of regulations and technology in their effects on producing
capacity.
C.

The Income-Growth Effect

A partial explanation of the growth of idle capacity may be
found in the combined effects of some over-optimism by the industry
of its forecasted growth rate as of about the mid-1950's, and the
momentum built up during the 1950's for expanding capacity by
intensive drilling that was being done and which was planned.
Immediately after World War II there was little, if any, unused
producing capacity. At the same time that gasoline rationing was
lifted, auto sales were growing rapidly, railroad dieselization was
in full swing, and home heating oil markets were growing. To meet
anticipated demands, considerable investments were made in exploration and development. In 1951 crude-oil production was 87.8
percent of NPC estimates of producing capacity, and idle capacity
was only 820,000 barrels daily.2 ° In the six years between 1951
and 1957 domestic demand grew 25 percent from 7,041,000 barrels
daily to 8,818,000 barrels daily. Capacity grew almost 47 percent,
from 6,727,000 barrels daily to 9,867,000 barrels daily. Excess
capacity in 1957 stood at 2,706,000 barrels daily, and production
as a percentage of capacity was only 72.6 percent.
The year 1957 is often viewed as the industry high-water mark.
Drilling hit a peak that year. It is amazing that drilling activity
did not turn down earlier and did not fall faster when it finally did
turn down. Clearly, there was some inertia at work. Fields, once
discovered, tend to be developed rapidly. As in the case of technology, there was probably some regulatory effect operating. As
20. Based on NPC capacity figure for January 1, 1951 of 6.7 million barrels daily
and Bureau of Mines average production of 1950 and 1951 of 5.9 million barrels
daily.
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late as 1955 there were more new fields developed on twenty-acre
spacing than on any other patterns. 2 ' It was not until 1961 that
eighty-acre spacing really took hold.
What finally turned drilling activity downward must have been
a realization of several of a series of things simultaneously. The
25-35 cent per barrel increase that came in 1957 during the Suez
Crisis and that generated the price conspiracy indictment of 29
oil companies 2 2 did not fully hold. Price erosion amounted to about
20 cents per barrel during the 1957 to 1960 period. It became
clear that general price increases would be politically dangerous
to attempt, in addition to the fact that the overhang of surplus
capacity would continually undermine existing price levels. Faced
with reduced well allowables, rising drilling costs, and little prospects
for crude oil price hikes, the industry reduced drilling efforts during
the 1960's. The drop in number of wells during the period overstates the decline in capacity and reserve additions because by the
mid-1960's well-spacing was getting wider, and it took fewer wells
to develop any given size field.
This discussion has been carried far enough to illustrate the complexity of forces at work causing the build-up of unused producing
capacity. While no specific responsibilities can be attached to individual forces, it seems clear that incentives built into state conservation regulations played a major role. It is also clear that while
occasional comments were dropped by regulatory officials about the
need for idle capacity to meet national security needs, 2 there was
no plan among the states to do this. Nor was the industry overjoyed
at the severe market demand restrictions during the late 1950's and
early 1960 s.24
Despite the unused capacity that existed during 1957, the Texas
Railroad Commission was criticized for not making needed oil
available. It was alleged that more oil could have been produced
from Texas Gulf Coast wells for export to Europe but that the
Commission could not legally, or would not, raise the Gulf Coast
allowables without also raising West Texas allowables a like
amount. To raise allowables throughout the state was impossible
because West Texas pipelines to the Gulf, as well as storage facilNat'l Petroleum Council, supra note 13, at 15.
22. The so-called "Tulsa" case was ultimately dismissed by the Federal District
Court in Tulsa for lack of evidence. United States v. Arkansas Fuel Oil Corp. (1959).
23. See Murray, Market Demand Proration, in Essays on Petroleum Conservation
Regulation, (W. Lovejoy & I. Pikl eds., Dep't of Economics, Southern Methodist University, 1960).
24. Market demand factors in Texas, for example, were: 1958-33.5%, 195933.6%, 1960-28.5%, 1961-27.7%, 1962-26.5%, and 1963-28.0%. Records of the
Tex. R.R. Comm'n.
21.
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ities, were full, and either purchaser prorationing or waste would
result.
State law in Texas prohibits discrimination among fields or regions
in the State, and different market demand factors in different fields
could be construed as discrimination. We shall not argue the fact
situation of 1957. For whatever reasons, the system appeared to be
inflexible in adjusting to the situation.
In summary, one might say that there are various forces at work
causing unused well-producing capacity to be increased or reduced.
State regulations affect the amount of capacity and the rate at which
capacity is developed. These regulations are not, however, designed
for this purpose; nor is anyone sure what changes in regulations
could be made to create an instrument on which we could rely for the
development and maintenance of proper amounts of idle capacity.
And finally, no one has answered the important question of how
much it costs to develop and maintain idle reserve capacity under
our present system, or any alternative system.
III
PRODUCING CAPACITY AND THE CONCEPT OF OIL SUPPLY

The remainder of this article takes up two questions. The first
deals with how much unused capacity remains in the domestic industry and what recent changes in state regulation have affected
either the utilization of capacity or the actual development of
capacity. The second deals with attempting to get some rough measure of the cost of unused capacity in this country. It should be
repeated that this second question assumes that one alternative to
meeting a national security energy need that should be explored is
the maintenance of unused capacity. We must begin to think in terms
of what such a system costs as compared to alternative systems.
It is not at all clear at this time what plan or system best fits our
needs. The main purposes of this discussion are to put forth some
numbers which others can attack, reject, or refine, and to attempt
to force the discussion of energy policy into a meaningful framework of economic analysis which permits logical choices to be made
among alternatives. No attempt is made here to define the dimensions of national security in the energy sector, and no attempt is
made to compute the costs of meeting security needs by alternative
means. Work on these questions is being done. 5 The Cabinet Task
25. An attempt to answer these questions is made in Lovejoy, supra note 9. See
also testimony before the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm. of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., Spring, 1969; and the submission to the Cabinet Task Force on Oil Import
Control by the Charles River Associates, Inc., An Analytical Framework for Evalu-
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Force on Oil Import Control has asked for answers to these and
other questions.26
There probably will never be general agreement on any single
concept of crude oil producing capacity or on any set of figures purporting to show capacities. The problems of definition and use
have been explored in detail elsewhere and will not be reviewed
here. In the new push by the federal government to get better and
more comprehensive statistical data on the oil industry, the American Petroleum Institute (API) agreed to develop a workable
definition for oil producing capacity and begin publishing capacity
data for the U.S. in geographic breakdown comparable to that
used in reserves reporting. These data were first reported and explained in 1968.28 The explanation emphasizes that capacity can
mean many things, and four concepts are described. One of the four
concepts, capacity possible after 90 days have elapsed (from
December 31 of each year), limited by a set of specified assumptions, was chosen for reporting purposes.
These data give some measure to which actual production can
be compared so that amounts and general location of unused capacity can be determined. It must be emphasized that well-producing
capacity says nothing about transportation, storage, or handling capacity of downstream facilities. This capacity does give us, however,
one useful supply concept for domestic oil. It is necessary to attempt
to grapple with the theory of domestic oil supply in order to analyze
the implications of the conservation system and changes in capacity.
The long-run supply curve for oil in a reasonably competitive
market unrestricted by any sort of regulation would typically reflect the sum of the marginal cost schedules of all the operators
in the industry. 20 Oil is fairly typical of any mining industry and in
long-run static analysis is characterized by increasing costs with
increasing output at any moment in time. This is true for all phases
of production-exploration, development, and lifting costs.30 Thus,
ating the Oil Import Quota Program, July 15, 1969; and also the submission of
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, Supplementary Report No. 1, Impact of
EliminatingImport Controls on the U.S. Oil Industry, July 14, 1969.
26. 34 Fed. Reg. 8056 (1969).
27. W. F. Lovejoy & P. T. Homan, Methods of Estimating Reserves of Crude
Oil, Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids (1965).
28. 22 Am. Gas Ass'n, Am. Petroleum Institute, Canadian Petroleum Ass'n, Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids, and Natural Gas in the United States and
Canada as of December 31, 1967, at 24-28, 82 (1968).
29. This assumes no change in the prices of factor inputs as industry and firm
outputs change.
30. See M. A. Adelman, The Supply and Price of Natural Gas, J. Industrial Econ.
(Supp. 1962), for the clearest explanation of cost characteristics in petroleum production; P. G. Bradley, The Economics of Crude Petroleum Production (Amsterdam,
North Holland Publishing Co., 1967).
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the supply curve for the industry, without regulation, is upward
sloping to the right. In order to induce greater quantities to be
put on the market, the price must be raised. On the demand side of
the market, there is a downward sloping demand curve generally
reflecting the fact that as price is raised, consumers are willing to
take less and less. For crude oil the demand is relatively price
inelastic in the current relevant price ranges. Economic theory tells
us that where the supply and demand intersect we find the equilibrium price and quantity.
What does regulation do to this picture? In the 19 2 0's and
1930's the industry was in the uncomfortable position of adding
greatly to supply at a time when demand was static or growing
slowly. The randomness of the "big strike" during these years was
operating with a vengeance. 31 The Oklahoma City and East Texas
Fields came in within a few months of each other and literally
doubled or tripled the country's potential oil supply. Figure 1
shows what happens when supply shifts abruptly to the right (increases) from S1 to S?, with little or no change in demand. Price
falls drastically, i.e., from P 1 to P2 .
FIGURE 1

$

St

Q/unit of time

31. A unique aspect of oil exploration and development is that the output per
dollar of input is not predictable with any reasonable degree of accuracy. This was
particularly true in the early days of the industry.
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The imposition of restrictions on supply through conservation
regulation did not shift supply back to the left. It merely meant a
moving up the demand curve, in Figure 2 from P 2 to P 3. However,
at P3 there is a "surplus" of supply or unused producing capacity.
In Figure 2 the market would take q3 at P 3, but the market is willing to supply q4 at that price. Excess capacity is then the amount
q4 - q3. The state regulatory commissions were performing true
conservation regulation in the sense that a producer who could
cover his marginal costs at P 2 would, if not regulated, produce
and likely damage the reservoir and reduce ultimate oil recovery.
Since marginal costs are a reflection of out-of-pocket or variable
costs, and since such costs tend to be low in new, prolific fields,
potential supply was large. The usual rationale for limiting resource
exploitation became partially inoperative for individual operators
under the law of capture. It was impossible for each operator to
adjust his rate of output to maximize the present value of his net
income stream over the life of the resource.3 2 If he did not produce
all he could today, his neighbor might take it away from him under
the law of capture. Future expected net revenue would be low indeed under such conditions.
In addition to "preventing physical waste," the regulations affected prices. Whether the commissions had a particular price in
mind or, for that matter, any price in mind, the effect of restricting
supply raised price. Once operative, the regulations did in fact
change the industry supply function. No producer under regulation
was willing to accept less than P 3 for his output, nor did he have to.
In effect the relevant supply schedule is perfectly elastic, but finite,
and is represented by P3 A in Figure 2. The segment AB represents
unused capacity at price P 3, and the total potential supply function
is P 3ABS 2.
The above discussion presents a static picture which shows conditions at any instant in time. No attempt is made here to develop
a dynamic model taking account of all interactions. We can attempt
in a general way to analyze how changes occur over time. Introducing a time dimension into the oil market affects both demand
and supply. The market for oil products, and thus for crude oil,
grows continually, or at least has done so for the past twenty years.
Thus we would expect a shift to the right in the demand curve over
32. See S. L. McDonald, Percentage Depletion, Expensing of Intangibles, and
Petroleum Conservation, in Extractive Resources and Taxation 275-277 (M. Gaffney
ed., 1967), for an elaboration of the theoretical model that shows this. Also in W.
Lovejoy & P. Homan, supra note 1, at 89-96.
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FIGURE 2
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time. 3 On the supply side two things are occurring simultaneously.
As production takes place through time, there is a shift to the left
in the supply function. This reflects the unique character of oil
reservoir depletion; as we move through time there is less oil that
producers are willing to sell at any given price. Offsetting this essentially cost raising feature through time is the fact that new reservoirs are being found, developed and produced, and this tends to
add to supply, i.e., shift it to the right.3 4 In addition, production
technology is apt to be improving through time, which also has the
effect of shifting supply to the right. 5 A similar shift could come
from cost-reducing improvements in conservation regulations over
time. In order to maintain any given absolute level of unused producing capacity, an increase in supply must offset (I) any increase
33. At any given price, consumers are willing to buy more. The shape and position of this demand curve is, of course, a function of many things, including the price
of substitutes, the technology of fuel consumption, general levels of business activity,
etc. These aspects will not detain us here.
34-. There is no guarantee of this, of course. If there is new development, however, the supply curve at some cost levels must shift to the right.
35. We have abstracted from the knotty problems caused by changes in factor
input prices through time. A change in technology normally implies a change in the
production functions for firms which may affect factor input prices. Mere growth in
output may force factor input prices up.
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in demand, and (2) the decrease in supply resulting from the
natural decline in the capacity of existing reservoirs. For instance,
Figure 3 shows a net increase in supply (net of any decrease due to
depletion) from S2 to S3, but a larger increase in demand from D1
to D 2. The effect is to reduce the surplus from an amount AB to an
amount CE. This is a reduction in absolute terms and, as a percentage of production, an even greater reduction.
FIGURE 3
S_.
$

D,

/

,
7-

/

-

Q/unit of time

If from year to year the unused capacity gap gets smaller and
smaller and ultimately disappears, the industry is faced with increasing prices because of rising costs. At this point a major concern for
the industry must be the price elasticity of demand for conventionally produced oil in higher price ranges. If substitute liquid
fuels are available (e.g., from oil shale, coal, and/or tar sands),
the demand for conventional oil becomes much more elastic at
higher prices. Presumably at some higher price, there is no demand
for oil at all; consumers use cheaper substitutes.
Thus far we have discussed the domestic oil industry without
reference to imports. While imports are, in fact, part of supply,
they can best be handled in the geometry used here by looking at
them as diminishing demand for domestically produced oil. An increase in imports would then have the effect of shifting the de-
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mand for domestic oil to the left. At any moment in time this increases the unused capacity gap. The problem in doing this is that
we have no precise way of knowing what effect increased imports
will have on domestic supply. Clearly, if producers maintain exploration and development so that supply increases net of natural
depletion, the gap grows even larger. Such action seems unlikely.
A growing gap of unused capacity means more stringent market
demand restrictions, and even though prices have remained the
same, producer incentives are diminished as per well production
declines.
This analysis tells us little about the costs of individual producers or the impact of costs, prices, allowables, etc., on individual
company decisions to explore or develop. These are critical matters
indeed, and ultimately affect the movements alluded to in the
example. We shall not pursue them here except to note that if an
avowed national policy is to provide a means of meeting national
security needs, promoting idle producing capacity at the wellhead
will be extremely complicated and subject to great uncertainty. No
one as yet has figured out what set of conditions will bring forth
a given amount of capacity in a prescribed period of time, and it
seems clear that the set of conditions would itself be constantly
changing. This warning should not be construed as advocating a
complete discarding of this sort of solution to security needs, but
rather to point out some of its problems and complications.
IV
U.S. PRODUCING CAPACITY IN 1969

Table 1 indicates the areas of the U.S. in which there is substantial unused capacity. This table compares January 1, 1969,
API capacity estimates with the average daily production for
January, 1969. The total idle capacity for the nation using these
data was over three million barrels daily, as of that date. Whether
this is a realistic figure will be discussed below. Two million barrels
were concentrated in Texas, primarily in the East Texas Field, the
Upper Gulf Coast, and the Permian Basin in far West Texas (Railroad Commission Districts 6, 3 and 8, 8-A, respectively). California had about 265,000 barrels of daily producing capacity, centered
primarily in the Elk Hills Field. Louisiana accounted for another
775,000 barrels daily, virtually all in offshore and onshore South
Louisiana fields.
Many industry observers take issue with the API figures and
maintain that they are too high. In particular, Texas capacity is
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Table 1
ESTIMATED 90-DAY CRUDE OIL PRODUCING CAPACITY,
CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION, AND UNUSED PRODUCING CAPACITY,
AS OF JANUARY 1, 1969
(000'S OF BARRELS PER DAY)

Region
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Illinois
Indiana
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana 4
North
South
Michigan
Mississippi
Montana
Nebraska
New Mexico
New York and
Pennsylvania
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Texas 4
District 1
2
3
4
5
6
7-B
7-C
8
8A
9
10
Utah
West Virginia
Wyoming
Miscellaneous 5

Unused
Capacity3

Capacity'

Production2

22
218
53
1,266
76
145
23
249
36
2,973
141
2,832
36
173
136
33
424-

22
177
50
1,000
79
145
22
241
36
2,198
137
2,061
34
161
127
34
354

0
41
3
266
-3
0
1
8
0
775
4
771
2
12
9
-1
70

17
66
32
588
5,007
52
288
901
306
93
947
116
129
1,053
866
171
85
67
10
393
12

13
61
31
622
3,004
51
185
395
257
46
290
102
134
774
523
163
85
65
7
379
13

4
5
1
-34
2,003
1
103
506
49
47
657
14
-5
279
343
8
0
2
3
14
-1

Total U.S.
12,055
8,870
3,185
Note: Details may not add to total due to rounding.
1 API, Reserqves of Crude Oil, Natural Gas Liquids and Natural Gas in the U.S.,
and Canada as of Dec. 31, 1968, p. 78.
2 U.S. Bureau of Mines, Monthly Petroleum Statement, January 1969, Table 3.
3 Col. 1 minus Col. 2.
4 State totals for Louisiana and Texas include on a combined basis 1,306,000
offshore.
5 Includes Arizona, Florida, Missouri, Nevada, South Dakota, Tennessee, and
Virginia.
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said to be over-stated. To support this view it is noted that larger
increases in the market demand percentage must now be made to
get the same amount of increased production. A one percentage
point increase in the market demand factor in 1967 added about
55,000 to 60,000 barrels of daily production when the market demand factor was in the 30 to 35 percent range. At the 60 to 65
percent range in 1969 a one percentage point increase added only
about 15,000 to 20,000 barrels of additional daily production. 6
While these kinds of figures are highly significant, they partially
obscure the fact that the top schedule allowable for a number of
37
giant Texas fields is below the efficient capacity of these fields.
Thus, even at a 100 percent market demand factor, Texas would
have some additional capacity. No one knows how much.3 Table
2 reflects the responsiveness of some areas of Texas to changes in
the market demand factor and the near total lack of responsiveness
of other areas. The table breaks the state down into the Railroad
Commission Districts, and reports API estimated daily production
by districts for various months during 1967, 1968, and 1969."
The applicable market demand factor is indicated for each month.
With a July, 1969, market demand factor 17.2 percentage points
higher than in January, 1967, production was significantly higher
in only four areas-Districts 2, 3, the East Texas Field, and 8 and
8A. In most of the other areas production was less.
Table 3 illustrates in another way the different capacity situations
in three major market demand states. It shows the market demand
factors by months for Texas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma from
January, 1967, through August, 1969. Louisiana has experienced the
least variation in market demand factor, indicating that fields
there are relatively responsive to increases in the percentage. In
Oklahoma the other extreme is found. This state apparently has no
more unused capacity at current rates of production. The rise from
90 to 100 percent did practically nothing to state production levels.
Texas seems to fall somewhere between Louisiana and Oklahoma.
36. The TRC in April, 1969, estimated actual production to be 3,071,000 BD with
a 53 percent market demand factor and 3,094,000 BD at 54 percent or an increase of
23,000 BD. In May, 1969 actual production at 62.5 percent was estimated to be
3,243,000 BD, and at 63.5 percent to be 3,258,000 BD, or an increase of 15,000 BD.
37. See Nine Texas Fields Pass Check on Spare Capacity, Oil & Gas J., June 23,
1969, at 63. The nine fields are East Texas, Kelly-Snyder, Wasson, Yates, Conroe,
Webster, Tom O'Conner, Hawking, and Neches.
38. Skying Demand Devouring the U.S. Crude-Oil Cushion, Oil & Gas J., April
28, 1969, at 33, reported that Texas could produce 3.5 to 3.8 million barrels daily
"running wide open." Personal correspondence with several oil companies puts the
capacity range at 3.8 to 4.2 million barrels daily in May, 1969.
39. API estimates of production are not precise, but are satisfactory for purposes
of illustration in this example.
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Table 3
MARKET DEMAND FACTORS
IN MAJOR PRODUCING STATES-1967-69

Texas

Louisiana

37.5
36.5
35.7
35.0

36
36
35
35

50
50
50
46

33.8
35.91
42.9"

34
343
38

42
42
54

54.0

45

54

46.72
42.8
40.8

47
40
39

54
54
54

December
1968 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August

40.8
45.7
47.0
49.6
46.7
45.7
45.2
46.4
44.8

40
40
42
44
42
42
42
43
43

54
54
60
75
75
75
75
75
75

September
October

41.3
41.3

41
40

75
75

November

41.3

40

75

December
1969 January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August

41.3
43.7
42.8
45.6
49.9
53.8
63.5
54.7
53.1

40
40
40
42
43
45
46
44
44

90
90
90
100
100
100
100
100
100

1967 January
February
March
April
May
June
July

33.8

August
September
October
November

54.0

Oklahoma

'June, 1967 originally set at 33.8; raised to 35.9 on June 15 for entire month.
2September, 1967 originally set at 54.0; lowered to 46.7 on Sept. 7, retroactive to

September 1.
' In June, 1967, the Louisiana Conservation Commissioner allowed production equal to
150 percent of allowables on the condition that the overage would be made up out of
later production. This emergency measure was terminated in September, 1967.
Source: Records of the respective state oil conservation authorities.

One often overlooked change in Texas regulations in recent years
may help to explain in part the increased volatility in market demand factors. In December, 1964, the Texas Railroad Commission
initiated "calendar day testing" for selected fields in the state to
determine the top schedule allowables for individual wells.40 Under
40. Most market demand states have a depth-acreage schedule or "yardstick"
which establishes top (100%) allowables for wells on the basis of producing depth
and well spacing. The deeper the well and the wider the spacing, the larger the top
schedule allowable. Market demand restrictions are given in terms of a percentage
of the top allowable. Top allowables have absolutely no relationship to maximum
efficient rates of production. See W. Lovejoy & P. Homan, supra note 1, at ch. 6.
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the previous system, for example, if a well had a top schedule allowable as set by the 1947 yardstick of 100 barrels per day and,
if under a 50 percent market demand factor the well could produce only 49 barrels daily, its top schedule allowable was set at 49
barrels per day. The market demand factor was then applied to the
49 rather than the 100 barrel top allowable; thus, actual allowed
production would be 25 barrels daily under a 50 percent market
demand factor. Such a system tended to make many prorated wells
41
have some excess capacity.
With calendar day testing, the hypothetical well in the previous
example would have its top schedule allowable set at 98 barrels
daily rather than 49 barrels, and thus with a 50 percent market
demand factor its allowable would reflect its capacity, 49 barrels
daily. As the well's capacity declines, the top schedule allowable
also declines, but the well is allowed to produce to its capacity.
Under this system there is no significant unused capacity in wells
in this stage of depletion.
To avoid disrupting the shares of the state allowable going to
individual fields, the Commission allowed only one field to be reviewed and changed at a time.4 2 There is time for about eight hearings per week under Commission procedure, which allowed about
35 fields a month to move to the new calendar day testing. 43 Over a
period of one to two years most of the major fields in the state had
hearings." The effect was gradually to absorb some of the previously idle capacity in the state. It also meant that substantial
jumps in the market demand factor could no longer be expected to
pull additional production from wells similar in situation to the
example above since they were already at capacity. Finally, in the
summer of 1968 the Commission established calendar day testing
for all fields in the state. 45 Texas thus joins Louisiana in using a
calendar day testing procedure to set top schedule allowables.
Two other changes in Texas regulations have affected capacity
utilization. During the Arab-Israeli War emergency, Texas was
called upon to produce substantially more oil. The market demand
41. There was a 1963 order which permitted calendar-day testing if the operator
attested that the schedule allowable could be made. This was not often used.
42. Calendar-DayTesting Eases into Texas, Oil & Gas J., Sept. 21, 1964, at 98.
43. The Commission sets two hearings a day on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, and one hearing a day on Monday and Friday.
44. By May 1, 1968, 2,682 of the 8,315 prorated fields in Texas were on calendarday testing. These fields accounted for 67.7% of all prorated allowable. See Texas
Shifting Oil Allow.able System, Oil & Gas J., July 15, 1968, at 98.

45. Railroad Commission of Texas, Oil and Gas Division, Docket No. 20-58, 691,
Special Order Amending Rule 49 (G) of the Statewide Conser'vation Rules of General
Application, State of Texas, by Changing Testing Requirements to Provide for
CalendarDay Testing, Austin, July 2, 1968.

JANUARY 1970]

CONSERVATION,

CAPACITY

AND SECURITY

83

factor was raised from 33.8 percent in May of 1967 to 54 percent
in August of that year. In order to avoid producing wells with
high gas-oil and water-oil ratios in some fields, the Commission
permitted production on a lease basis rather than a well basis. The
effect was to get more production from some fields. Rather than
allowing each well to produce a given allowable, the allowables
of all the wells on a lease could be, in effect, pooled, and the lease
allowable produced from any of the wells.4 6 The effect of this
change was that wells having trouble making their allowable could
be helped by the more prolific wells on the same lease. With a rapid
rise in allowables, and little time for well testing, it was inevitable
that some leases were producing significantly larger quantities of
oil under lease allowables than they would have under single well
allowables. The overall effect was to create a situation in which
capacity in the state was more fully utilized. Lease allowables were
made permanent in the spring of 1968. 47 Under lease allowables in
most fields, the operator cannot officially abandon a well and keep
the same allowable. However, some wells may never be produced.
Testing is done on a lease rather than a well basis.
The final change in Texas regulations was the relaxation of gasoil ratio requirements. The general rule is that a well cannot produce more than 2,000 cubic feet of gas for each barrel of oil. If
excessive gas is produced, a penalty in the form of lower oil allowables is imposed. The Commission, on a field by field basis, has relaxed its 2,000 to 1 gas-oil ratio regulation for certain solution-gas
reservoirs to permit higher gas production, provided that the operator has a market for all gas produced.4 8 The effect has been to
allow greater oil production from certain wells and to better utilize
the capacity to produce oil.
V
THE COST OF UNUSED PRODUCING CAPACITY

The preceding discussion is not particularly satisfying in answering the question of how much capacity does the U.S. have in mid1969. However, a few conclusions can be drawn. There is still a
substantial amount of capacity at the wellhead, somewhere between
two and three million barrels daily, and this lies almost exclusively
46. There were certain restrictions on production by wells near lease lines to
avoid drainage from other leases. Also, a well would produce no more than twice its
allowable.
47. Railroad Commission of Texas, Oil and Gas Division, Docket No. 20-58,054,
Special Order Permitting a Statewide Lease Allowable System in Texas, Austin, April
17, 1968. The East Texas Field was specifically excluded from using lease allowables,
but was granted an allowable transfer rule.
48. The Commission has tightened regulations restricting the flaring of gas.
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in certain large fields in Texas and South Louisiana. Idle capacity
has been shrinking in recent years, but opinion is divided on just
how fast this is happening. We have not opened the door to speculation about two other related questions: (1) what could U.S. fields
produce if all economic considerations are discarded; i.e., some sort
of critical emergency, and (2) what could U.S. fields produce if
time were allowed for necessary additions to and alterations in
field and well facilities and operators were assured there would be
a demand at current prices for whatever oil could be produced for
as long into the future as anyone wanted to project. These are
both useful concepts, but especially the latter since it is a type of
long-run economic efficiency idea. In both instances the capacity
figures would likely be above the current 90-day capacity estimates.
Given the estimates of capacity that are currently available, with
all the caveats concerning their reliability, is it possible to estimate
a cost figure for carrying this capacity? The following discussion
develops one technique for making such a measurement. An estimate is made of the cost of unused capacity as of January, 1969.
A.P.I. capacity figures for December 31, 1968 are used since no
better figures by regions were available at the time of writing.
There is no connotation attached to the figures that this is a necessary or unnecessary cost. Also, no judgment is made concerning
what level of capacity is proper for normal flexibility of operations
in a world in which national security is not a consideration. These
figures are presented (1) to spark discussion in the general area of
national security costs, (2) to begin to develop techniques for
measuring costs, and (3) to give a bench mark from which to judge
the costs of alternative plans for meeting national security goals.
The approach taken in the following discussion is to estimate the
amount of investment in unused oil producing capacity and related
facilities and then to apply an expected normal rate of return on
investment for the oil industry in order to come up with an opportunity cost concept for the unused resources in the oil industry
which could have been profitably employed in alternative investment
opportunities. This can be viewed as the annual cost of unused producing capacity. In order to make such an estimate, several investment categories were pieced together. These include: (a) the cost
of drilling and equipping producing or producible oil wells; (b)
the cost of equipping these wells with the necessary surface equipment; and (c) the cost of drilling the dry holes that are inevitable
in the drilling of productive wells. In addition to this investment
there are the recurring items such as the cost of maintaining the
idle capacity in a state of readiness. Excluded from consideration

JANUARY

1970]

CONSERVATION,

CA4P4CITY

AND SECURITY

85

are the necessary downstream investments in gathering lines, trunk
pipe lines, storage, and terminal facilities required to make the
idle capacity truly useable in case of emergency. It is strange indeed
that more work has not been done to relate amounts and locations
of idle producing capacity with the facilities to move the crude to
markets, if national security is truly a concern. The National Petroleum Council (NPC) has undertaken studies of transportation
facilities in the U.S.,4" but there have been no attempts to relate
these to well capacities.
Table 4 shows the calculation of investment in drilling and equipping idle producing oil wells for the major producing states. Column
1 shows the American Petroleum Institute's estimates of 90-day
producing capacity by states and subdivisions of Texas. These data
are a new series distinct from previous capacity data collected by
the NPC and the Independent Petroleum Association of America
(IPAA). They report the capabilities of existing fields as of
January 1, 1969, and reflect limitations in reservoir capacity, well
equipment capacity, and lease equipment capacity." Column 2
shows the average daily production for January, 1969, as reported
by the Bureau of Mines. Column 3 is the difference in capacity and
production. Column 4 shows the number of oil wells producing at
the end of 1968 as estimated by World Oil. Column 5 shows capacity per well for each region and was obtained by dividing the number of producing wells into total capacity for each region. Column
6 shows the theoretical number of "idle wells" and was obtained
by dividing average capacity per well into the total amount of idle
capacity for each region. Column 7 indicates the average cost of
drilling and equipping producing oil wells for each region as reported in the Joint Association Survey for 1966. Column 8 is the
product of multiplying the theoretical number of idle wells by the
average cost per producing oil wells. The total investment in idle
oil wells derived from this computation comes to about $4.6 billion.
49. National Petroleum Council, U.S. Petroleum and Gas Transportation Capacities
(1967).
50. The API definition of crude oil productive capacity is as follows:
The 90-day crude oil productive capacity is the maximum daily crude production rate, at the point of custody transfer, that could be achieved in 90
days with existing wells, well equipment and surface facilities-plus work
and changes that can be reasonably accomplished within the time period
using present service capabilities and personnel, and with productivity declining as it would under capacity operation. It is assumed that there would
be no change in crude oil prices or costs of materials, equipment and/or
labor, no statutory restrictions on production rates (but no relief from surface regulations on gas and/or water production), no restrictions on storage
or transportation beyond the point of custody transfer, and no lack of
markets. Am. Gas Ass'n, supra note 28, at 25.
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It is obvious that such a calculation can be challenged at various
points. The API capacity figures tend to be higher than those reported by the IPAA, and cannot be reconciled with the IPAA data
even if adjustments are made for differences in definition. We have
already noted some of the quarrels with the API figures. It can
be argued that excess capacity is concentrated in relatively new wells
in each region, and thus it is unrealistic to obtain an average capacity per well figure from which to determine the number of idle
wells. There is no ideal way to handle this problem. Prolific wells
do contain the excess capacity but primarily because of the artificial restraints imposed by market demand proration regulations.
If producers were left to decide which wells to shut in, no doubt
they would start with the least profitable. No guess is made here as
to the order in which wells might be closed. There is much to be
said for "spreading" the idle capacity over all existing wells, since
each producing well could be restricted to meet consumption needs.
Thus, in a sense we are saying that part of the investment in each
well is excess, fully realizing that each well requires a minimum investment to be a productive well.
Professor Adelman has tackled the problem of measuring the
cost of capacity in much more detail in his work on estimating the
cost of finding and developing oil in different parts of the world."1
He in effect builds a time series of gross additions to capacity to
determine a "marginal cost" per barrel of daily producing capacity.52 A marginal concept would be useful because it would avoid the
assumption made in this paper that the "average" well is representative of the wells that are idle. Regional data do not permit this
sort of analysis, but a rough check against Adelman's figures is
made below.
It is also possible to argue that the actual average cost of wells
as they have been drilled historically should be calculated rather
than using 1966 figures. A check of well costs back to 1960 in the
Joint Association Survey does not reveal any major differences in
costs per well; in some regions costs were higher and in some regions
they were lower. It must also be remembered that the costs of unused capacity are incurred continuously over time so long as unused
capacity exists. We have taken a point in time to indicate the cost
in a particular year. There is a stream of costs reaching back in
51. Adelman, Oil Production Costs in Four Areas, in Proceedings of the Council of
Economics, American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical, and Petroleum Engineers
(March, 1966).
52. See Adelman, Trends in Cost of Finding and Developing Oil and Gas in the
U.S., in Essays in Petroleum Economics for data on costs of new capacity. (S. H.
Hanke & S. L. Gardiner eds., 1967).
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time for about twenty years, since we have had unused capacity
for most of the post World War II period. We have not accumulated this past stream of costs and incorporated them into the annual cost indicated.
The second step in the investment calculation was to make an
estimate of expenditures on dry holes that are, in a sense, "excess"
dry holes. While most would agree that some dry holes costs should
be included in unused investment, it is difficult to devise a satisfactory method for inclusion. Some would argue that even though
there are too many producing wells in existence, no one would
drill unnecessary dry holes. Others would argue that in each field
some dry holes are drilled to define the field limits, and thus if
there are some unused fields or their equivalent, there are also
some unnecessary dry holes. To develop capacity requires the drilling of both productive wells and dry holes. The latter line of reasoning seems the soundest and has been adopted here. The method
of calculation is simple. An examination of drilling statistics for
Table 5
DETERMINATION OF THE RATIO OF DRY DEVELOPMENT
WELLS TO PRODUCTIVE OIL WELLS
(DATA FOR 1967)

Total Wells
Oil
Gas
Dry

15,329
3,659
13,246

Exploratory
Wells
986
532
7,360

Development
Wells
14,343
3,127
5,886

Allocation of Dry
Development Holes
4,827
1,059

82%
18%

Total 32,234
8,878
23,356
Ratio of development oil wells to dry holes attributed to oil wells is 2.97
to 1 (14,343).
4,827
Source: Oil and Gas Journal,Dec. 30, 1968, p. 92 from AAPG.

1967, for example, reveals the data shown in Table 5. By removing exploratory drilling from total drilling figures we get development drilling. We can then allocate dry development holes by computing the percentage of productive wells in gas and in oil. For this
year the figures show 18 percent were gas and 82 percent were oil.
We then can relate the productive oil wells to the allocated oil dry
holes and find that about three productive wells were drilled for
each dry hole. This ratio does not vary greatly from year to
year. Using this ratio we can divide the number of idle productive
oil wells in Column 6, Table 4, by three to determine the number
of unnecessary dry holes, which are reported in Column 2, Table
6. Column 3 of this Table is the average cost of dry holes in the
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Table 6
CALCULATION OF THE COST OF UNNECESSARY DRY
DEVELOPMENT HOLES AS OF JANUARY, 1969

Av.

Texas:
District
1
2
3
4
5
6
7-B
8 and 8A
9
Alaska
Louisiana:
North
South, incl.
offshore
Mississippi
New Mexico
California
Kansas
Wyoming
Total

Cost/Dry

Total Cost of

No. of "Unused" No. of "Unused" Hole-1966'
Wells'
Dry Holes'
$

"Unused" Dry
Holes' $

196
2,044
6,866
1,546
1,469
15,103
1,573
18,348
1,429

65
681
2,286
515
489
5,029
524
6,110
476

34

11

.992,398

10,916

388

129

26,922

3,473

4,434
180
2,373
8,721
1,455
318

1,477
60
790
2,904
485
106

48,147
227,782'
227,782'
48,147
72,742
72,742
18,271
75,065
18,271

260,0685
58,997
66,569
73,117
18,746
58,528

3,130
155,120
520,710
24,796
35,571
365,820
9,574
458,647
8,697

384,120
3,540
52,590
212,332
9,092
6,204
2,264,922

'From Table 4, Col. 6.
' Assuming 1 dry hole per 3 productive wells.
'Joint Association Survey, 1966, Section 1.
'Col. 2 times Col. 3.
'Weighted average cost of onshore and offshore dry holes.

various states and regions with unused capacity. Average costs per
dry hole in each region were multiplied by the number of unnecessary dry holes to get the investment in unnecessary dry holes shown
in Column 4. Total investment comes to $2.3 billion for 1968. This
is a conservative figure because the calculations ignore exploratory
dry-hole drilling which, it can be argued, should be included in the
unnecessary dry hole expense. This would raise the number of dry
holes drilled per productive well, and thus raise the investment
in unnecessary dry holes. Exploratory dry holes are omitted here
because these wells were primarily significant in obtaining information rather than in adding to producing capacity. They obviously
play a role in the ultimate discovery of reserves, and hence in
capacity. The choice here is to err on the side of conservatism.
The third component of unnecessary investment is in equipment
"beyond the Christmas tree" on unnecessary wells. Section 1 of
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the Joint Association Survey reports well costs only through the
Christmas tree (the valves and other well-head fittings). Specifically
excluded from these data are artificial-lift equipment, gas-oil separation equipment, flow lines, lease tanks, and other measuring and
miscellaneous equipment on the lease. An estimate of per well costs
for artificial-lift equipment can be obtained from the annual estimates of numbers of producing oil wells on artificial lift and annual
expenditures for artificial lift equipment made by World Oil. Table
7 shows number of wells put on artificial lift for the years 1965
through 1968 and the estimated expenditures for equipping these
wells and maintaining equipment on existing artificial-lift wells.
The cost-per-well figures were obtained by dividing total annual
expenditures by the number of wells put on lift each year.
Table 7
NEW WELLS PUT ON ARTIFICIAL LIFT
AND COST OF EQUIPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

(1965-1969)

Year

No. of Wells

Estimated
Total Cost
(000's $)

1969
1968
1967
1966
1965

15,196
18,513
18,382
19,800
21,063

$92,049
94,211
95,377
95,578
97,619

$6,057
5,089
5,189
4,827
4,635

92,954

$474,834

$5,108

Cost! Well

Source: World Oil, Annual Review and Forecast Issues, February 15, 1965, 1966,
1967, 1968, and 1969.

It is extremely difficult to interpret these figures. There is no
way to know how much is spent to put new wells on artificial lift
as opposed to amounts spent to replace worn out equipment.5"
Some equipment such as the pumping unit itself is long-lived and
is often moved from well to well as abandonment occurs. Other
equipment such as sucker rods and pumps which are down hole and
subject to friction and corrosion wear out more rapidly. The data
seem to indicate an equipment cost per well of about $5,000.
In an attempt to confirm this figure a check was made with a
major oil-well supply company on the investment in artificial lift
equipment for a representative 4,500-foot well. The estimate was
between $8,000 and $10,000, using 1969 prices and new equip53. Conversations with representatives of the oil-field equipment supply business
indicate that over one-half the annual expenditures are for maintenance with the
bulk going for down-hole equipment such as sucker rods, tubing, pumps, etc.
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ment. 54 Since the greatest expense is for the pumping unit and power
equipment, and since many such units are second or third hand, a
$8,000 to $10,000 figure overstates the cost of equipment on the
average well. A $5,000 figure, however, probably understates the
cost. If we use a figure of $6,000 per well and multiply this by the
number of wells on artificial lift at the end of 1968, about 494,000
wells, we get a total investment of about $3.0 billion.
About ninety percent of the total number of producing wells are
on artificial lift, and it was assumed that the same percentage of
the "excess" wells were also on artificial lift. By summing Column
6 of Table 4, we find there were 66,477 "excess" wells of which
90 percent or 59,829, were on artificial lift. At $6,000 per well, this
represents an investment of about $359 million in excess artificial
lift equipment. This is an extremely rough figure, but is perhaps
of the correct magnitude.
Still not included is investment in other lease equipment for such
things as gas-oil separators, lease tanks, flow lines, and the like.
Section 2 of the Joint Association Survey estimates the costs of
"equipping leases" which includes all well and lease expenditures
beyond the Christmas tree (well-head fittings), and thus includes
artificial lift expenditures as well as all other production equipment
expenditures. For 1966 the total industry expenditure for equipping
leases was $878 million, 5 and had ranged from $446 million to
$878 million during the past six years.5 6 A rough measure of the
per well investment in other than artificial lift equipment can perhaps be got from the ratio of total lease equipping costs to artificial
lift costs which comes to about 6 to 1." This would mean an investment in all lease equipment of about $36,000 per well, and in
equipment other than artificial lift of about $30,000 per well. With
54. The company asked to remain anonymous.
55. The JAS for 1966 breaks down the $878 million expenditures in the following
way:
Lease equipment
$459 million
Improved Recovery Programs
187
Other, including Direct Overhead
119
Drilling and Production Platforms
113
Total
$878
"
Not included is allocation of
General and Administrative Overhead.
to Development
$168
Grand Total
$1,046
"
See JAS, 1966, Section 2, Table I.
56. See JAS, 1965, Section 2, Table I, and JAS, 1966, Section 2, Table II.
57. World Oil estimated annual artificial lift expenditures range from $92 million
to almost $98 million between 1965 and 1969. JAS estimates of total lease equipping
expenditures range from $446 million to $878 million.
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66,477 excess wells, the total investment in non-artificial lift lease
equipment would be about $2.0 billion. Again, this is at best a
very rough figure.58
If the investment in excess producing wells, excess dry holes, and
excess lease equipment is summed, the total excess investment comes
to about $9.3 billion. This is shown in Table 8. This investment
figure excludes industry expenditures on geological and geophysical
work behind the "excess" wells. 9 Some of this could legitimately
be included as part of the investment in unused capacity. As was
noted earlier, some of the exploratory dry hole expenditures should
perhaps also be allocated to unused capacity.
Table 8
INVESTMENT IN UNUSED OIL PRODUCING CAPACITY
IN THE U.S. AS OF JANUARY, 1969
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

Drilling and equipping through the

Christmas tree of excess wells
Drilling excess dry holes
Excess artificial lift equipment

Excess lease equipment other than artificial lift
Total

$4.6
2.3
0.4

2.0
$9.3

There are some rough ways to check whether or not this $9.3
billion is in the general range of reasonableness. Adelman estimated
investment per barrel of crude oil capacity, using 1960-63 data at
$3,550.60 If we apply this figure to the API derived figure of three
million barrels of idle daily capacity, the investment is $10,650
million. If we take a lower figure for idle daily capacity of two million barrels, the investment is $7.1 billion. It is difficult to generalize on what has happened to investment per barrel of capacity
figures during the 1960's. As industry efficiency and regulations
have improved, the cost per barrel should have declined. Smaller
fields and general inflation may have pushed costs up. The estimates using Adelman's figures are of the same magnitude as those
computed in this article.
A second rough check can be made by working back from reserves
figures. It is possible to compute a figure showing the barrels of
reserves per barrel of producing capacity. By assuming different
58. Some investment obviously goes to gas leases. We have ignored this because
the expenditure per lease is usually relatively small and the number of gas wells is
substantially less than oil. We have no way of separating oil and gas figures.
59. Geological and geophysical expenditures are carried entirely under exploration in the Joint Association Survey. They averaged $334 million a year from 19621966, Joint Association Survey, 1966, Section 2, at 6.

60. Adelman, supra note 52, at 68.
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values for proved reserves in the ground, it is possible to obtain an
approximation of investment per barrel of capacity. Table 9 presents some estimates using this technique. Two different capacity
assumptions were made. Assumption number 1 takes the reported
API reserves and producing capacity as of December 31, 1968.
This yields an idle capacity of about three million barrels daily.
Assumption number 2 takes API reserves and a lower capacity
figure of 11 million, rather than 12 million barrels daily. This yields
an idle capacity of about two million barrels daily. In-place reserve
values of $1.00, $1.25, and $1..50 per barrel were used to compute
investment in idle capacity. Under assumption number 1 investment
Table 9
ESTIMATES OF INVESTMENT IN UNUSED PRODUCING CAPACITY
FROM RELATING RESERVES TO CAPACITY AND ASSUMING VALUES FOR RESERVES

Assumption
No. 1
2,547

Assumption
No. 2
2,792

Reserves/Bbl. of Capacity (Bbls.)
Investment/Bbl. of Capacity at:
$1.00/Bbi. of Reserves
$2,547
$2,792
$1.25/Bbl. of Reserves
3,184
3,490
$1.50/Bbl. of Reserves
3,821
4,188
Investment in Unused Capacity at:
$1.00/Bbl. of Reserves-Mil. $'s
7,641
5,584
$1.25/Bbl. of Reserves-Mil. $'s
9,552
6,980
$1.50/Bbl. of Reserves-Mil. $'s
11,463
8,376
Assumption No. 1: Proved crude oil reserves on December 31, 1968 were 30,707,117,000 bbls. and producing capacity was 12,055,000 bbls. daily. Unused capacity was
3,000,000 barrels daily.
Assumption No. 2: Proved crude oil reserves on December 31, 1968 were 30,707,117,000 bbls. and producing capacity was 11,000,000 bbls. daily. Unused capacity was
2,000,000 barrels daily.

ranged from $7.6 billion to $11.5 billion. Under assumption number 2 investment ranged from $5.6 billion to $8.4 billion. This
technique also indicates a magnitude of values in the same general
range as computed in this article.
To obtain an annual cost figure it is necessary to apply some
rate of return to the investment in unused capacity. The question
we are asking here is what return could these resources have earned
in the most profitable alternative investment by the oil industry?
Adelman selects an after-tax rate of return of nine percent in his
calculations to determine the cost per barrel of oil in the U.S. 6 He
uses a 20 percent rate of return in calculating oil costs in the Persian
Gulf, Africa, and Venezuela. The Federal Power Commission al61. Adelman, supra note 51, at 18 ff.
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lowed gas producers in the Permian Basin a 12 percent rate of
return in calculating area gas prices for West Texas and Southeast
New Mexico. 2 The Chase Manhattan Bank reports that for 1968
the after-tax rate of return on average invested capital for the
group of petroleum companies it analyzes annually was 12.2 percent, with the figure for the domestic figure at 12.2 percent and
that for the foreign sector at 12.3 percent. 63 It seems reasonable
to choose a figure in the 10 to 15 percent range which would produce an annual cost of from $930 million to $1,395 million on an
investment of $9.3 billion.
These rates are applied to the total computed investment in unused capacity without taking into account depreciation. Obviously,
the facilities producing at less than full capacity are partially depreciated. We are not viewing this investment in an accounting
sense but rather in an economic sense. The funds invested in idle
capacity ten years ago could have earned a return, and the funds
would have been returned through depreciation for further investment. This is an opportunity cost concept which relates to alternative uses of funds with the assumption that the funds continuously
flow out through investment and back in through depreciation.
To this opportunity cost of investment in unused producing
capacity must be added some producing costs and overhead to gain
a complete picture. It could be argued that unused capacity is not
produced and therefore does not entail production costs, but this
is highly unrealistic. While it is true that some producing costs
such as fuel, power, and water are primarily a function of production, it is also true that most of the labor, supplies, insurance, etc.,
are fixed costs which are incurred whether a field produces at 50
percent of capacity or 100 percent of capacity. These fixed costs
could be avoided if certain fields had never been developed. This
is obviously not realistic, either. Producing costs for oil and gas,
including direct overhead but excluding all production and ad
valorem taxes in 1966, were $1.895 billion.64 Another $310 million
of general and administrative overhead was allocated to production, for a total of $2.205 billion. It seems reasonable to attribute
about ten percent of these costs to idle capacity. This makes allowances for gas production expenses and variable costs which are
strictly a function of oil output. Producing costs in 1968 would
undoubtedly be higher than in 1966. We will attribute $200 mil62. Permian Basin Rate Cases, 34 F.P.C. 159 (1965).
63. Chase Manhattan Bank, 1968 Annual Financial Analysis of a Group of
Petroleum Companies 16 (1966).
64. JAS for 1966, Section 2, Table I.
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lion as the portion of 1968 producing costs borne by idle capacity.
This gives an annual cost range of from $1,130 million to $1,595
million for 1968.
CONCLUSIONS

This paper has attempted to analyze two questions: (1) assuming that the U.S. wishes to maintain some substantial degree of oil
self-sufficiency, can the country rely on the industry, operating
within the confines of state conservation regulations, to develop and
maintain the proper amounts of standby or reserve producing capacity; (2) assuming that standby capacity is the desired means to
meet national security needs, how can the cost of this capacity be
measured? The answer to the first question is negative. The causes
of the growth of idle capacity during the 1950's and early 1960's
are complex, but clearly the incentives to do so that are built into
market demand prorationing systems contributed significantly. There
is no way, however, to adjust conservation regulations to provide
for any specific amount of idle capacity, and indeed these regulations are designed for other reasons, and generate idle capacity by
accident. Those people who defend conservation regulations by
arguing that they have provided the country with reserve capacity
during crises are doing a disservice to the conservation system, the
oil industry, and the country.
As state regulations have improved, incentives for the industry
to develop idle capacity have diminished. It seems likely that capacity will continue to decline outside of Alaska and perhaps
Louisiana. The U.S. must decide what national security posture
with respect to oil it will take in the future, and then develop state
and federal policies to achieve these goals. Failure to do so will
result in higher energy costs to U.S. consumers, lower profits to
the oil industry, and the waste of domestic oil resources. Government policies change slowly unless shaken to their foundations by
major events. Such an event in the U.S. may be the discovery and
development of low cost oil resources in the Alaskan and Canadian
arctic. This development may well force crude oil prices in the
U.S. lower and stimulate additional changes in state and federal
regulations in the direction of greater efficiency.
The current costs of maintaining idle capacity are in the range
of $1 billion to $1.5 billion annually, as computed using the methods
outlined herL. It is impossible to determine whether this is "too
high" or "too low," because as yet we have no firm national goals
in mind, nor has anyone carefully looked at alternatives. These
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figures, it should be emphasized, exclude all investments beyond
the producing lease. Industry briefs to the Cabinet Task Force on
Oil Import Control have generally rejected alternative ways of
providing capacity, such as above-ground storage, government purcase of producing capacity,65 and development of synthetic fuels
capacity. Little solid evidence is available on what any of the alternatives cost, or for that matter what present capacity costs. Until
such evidence is in, there will remain much uncertainty about present oil policies. If the industry is convinced that there is a need
to restrict imports for national security reasons and that there is
a need to have some sort of capacity available, it should bring forth
its proposals as to how this should be done and at what cost.

65. For an interesting proposal of federal purchase and maintenance of producing capacity, see McDonald, Conservation Policies and National Security, paper to the
Rocky Mountain Petroleum Economics Institute, Colorado Springs, June 24, 1969.
Professor McDonald finds the present system unreliable with respect to generating
the needed capacity.

